What FM can offer DFCS design by Rushby, John
..j •
v
N91-17565
(
What FM can offer DFCS Design
John Rushby
Computer
SRI
Science Laboratory
International
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19910008252 2020-03-19T19:39:59+00:00Z
Overview
• What has actually gone wrong in practice?
• What is the pattern?
• What is the solution?
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Advanced Fighter Technology
(AFTI) F16
Integration
• Triplex DFCS to provide two-fail
design
operative
• Analog backup
• Digital computers were not synchronized
"General Dynamics believed synchronization
would introduce a single-point failure caused
by EMI and lightning effects"
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AFTI F16 DFCS Redundancy Management
Each computer samples sensors
independently, uses average of the
channels, with wide threshold
good
• Single output channel selected from among
the good channels
• Output threshold 15% plus rate of change
• Four bad values in a row and the channel is
voted out
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AFTI F16 Flight Test, Flight 15
Stores Management System (SMS)
pilot requests for mode changes to
relays
DFCS
• An unknown failure in the SMS caused it to
request mode changes 50 times a second
• DFCS responded at a rate of 5 mode
changes per second
• Pilot said aircraft felt like it was in turbulence
Analysis showed that if aircraft had been
maneuvering at the time, DFCS would have
failed
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AFTI F16 Flight Test, Flight 36
Control law problem led
three seconds duration
to "departure" of
Sideslip exceeded 20 °, normal acceleration
exceeded -4g, then -I-7g, angle of attack
went to -10 °, then -I-20 °, aircraft rolled
360 °, vertical tail exceeded design load,
failure indications from canard hydraulics,
and air data sensor
Side air data probe blanked by
high AOA
canard at
Wide threshold passed
channels took different
laws
error,
paths
different
through control
Analysis showed this would cause
failure of DFCS and reversion to
backup for several areas of flight
complete
analog
envelope
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AFTI F16 Flight Test, Flight 44
Asynchronous
noise led each
failed
operation,
channel to
skew, and sensor
declare the others
Analog backup not selected (simultaneous
failure of two channels not anticipated)
• Aircraft flown home on a single digital
channel
• No hardware failures had occurred
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AFTI F16 Flight Test
Repeated channel failure indication in flight
was traced to roll-axis software switch
Sensor noise and asynchronous operation
caused one channel to take a different patti
through the control laws
• Decided to vote the software switch
• Extensive simulation and testing performed
• Next flight, same problem still there
Found that although switch value was voted,
the unvoted value was used
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X29 Flight Test
• Three sources of air data on X29A: nose
two side probes
and
• If value from nose is within threshold of
side probes, use nose probe value
both
• Threshold is large due to position errors in
certain flight modes
• If nose probe failed to zero at low speed it
would still be within threshold of correct
readings
• Aircraft would become unstable and "depart"
• Caught in simulation but 162 flights had
been at risk
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Single
HiMAT Flight
failure in redundant
Test
uplink hardware
Software
operation
detected this, and continued
But would
deployed
not allow the landing skids to be
Aircraft landed
little damage
with skid retracted, sustained
Traced to timing change in the
had survived extensive testing
software that
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Gripen Fight Test, Flight 6
• Unstable aircraft
• Triplex DFCS with Triplex analog backup
• Yaw oscillations observed on several flights
• Final flight had uncontrollable pitch
oscillations
• Crashed on landing, broke left main gear,
flipped
• Traced to control laws
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Space
Voyager computer clocks skipped 8 seconds
at Jupiter due to high radiation levels
(AW_zST Aug 7, 1989)
So "continuous resynchronization" provided
at Neptune
Also,
round
remember STS-I "The bug
the world" (SEN Oct 1981)
heard
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FDZR and Crew Interface
• ]:maginary crash scenario
• Broken fan blade on port engine
• Port vibration sensor saturates, limiter cuts in
• Vibration travels down wing,
starboard engine
shakes
• Starboard vibration sensor reports the
attenuated vibration
• Only starboard vibration warning light comes
on in cockpit
• Pilot shuts down the good engine,
stlort of runway
crashes
• Similar to British Midland 737 crash in 1989
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Complexity and Integration
"The.FMS of
software bugs
to G_rard Guyot (Airbus test
development director). There
the A320 'was still
until mid-January,'
and
was
revealing
according
no
particular type of bug in any particular
function, he says. 'We just had a lot of
flying to do in order to check it all out.
Then suddenly it was working,' he says with
a grin" (Flight International, 27 Feb 1989)
The ATF hardware is ready to go, but
cannot be flown because the software
engineers "can't get all the O's and l's
right order" (Northrop Engineer, 7 Aug,
1990)
in the
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Complexity and Integration
_,s of early 1988 A300 A310 A320
_ut in service 1982 1983 1988
_umber in service 16 149 3
:lightHours 16,000 810,000 2,000
kutopilot
_udder
kutothrottle
2 FCC
2 FAC
1 TCC
Computers
2 Fcc
2 FAC
1 or 2 TCC
;lats and flaps
£1evator/aileron
;poilers
:uei management
nstruments
Brakes
-ngines
2 SFCC
2 EFCU
2 FLC
2 CGCC
3 SGU
2 FADEC
2 FMGC
2 FAC
2 SFC C
2 ELAC
3 SEC
3 DMC
2 BSCU
2 FADEC
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Analog, Mechanical Backups
Do mechanical and
the requirement for
analog backups
ultra-reliability
reduce
in DFCS?
Not if the DFCS
augmentation or
is providing stability
envelope protection
Similar problem
traffic at higher
handle
in ATC_potential to move
rates than the backup can
No FAA certification
rudder and trim-tab
credit for
on A320
mechanical
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Analysis: Dale Mackall, NASA Engineer
AFTI F]6 Flight Test
Nearly all failure indications were not due
actual hardware failures, but to design
oversights concerning asynchronous
computer operation
tO
Failures due
interactions
to lack of understanding of
among
o Air data system
o Redundancy management software
o Flight control laws
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FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
RELIABILITY HEAVILY DEPENDENT
ON SYSTEM INTERACTIONS
HARDWARE SOFTWARE EXTERNAL
RELIABILITY RELIABILITY SYSTEMS EVENTS
INTERACTIONS
Analysis: NASA-LaRC 1988
Technology Workshop
FCDS
• Lack of fully effective design and validation
methods with support tools to enable
engineering of highly-integrated,
flight-critical digital systems
• Complexity of failure containment, test
coverage, FMEA, redundancy management,
especially in the face of increased integration
of flight-critical functions
• Sources of failure:
o Multiple independent faults (never
observed)
o Single point failures (observed sometimes)
o Domino failures (most common?)
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Analysis: Scientific Foundations
It is time to place the
real-time systems on a
Real-time systems are
development of
firm scientific basis.
built one way or
another because that was the way the last
one was built. And, since the last one
worked, we hope that the next one will.
(Fred Schneider)
"Not far from there (CNRS-LAAS), Airbus
Industries builds the Airbus A320s. These
are the first commercial aircraft controlled
solely by
system.
owes
1989,
a fault-tolerant, diverse computing
Strangely enough this development
little to academia. (IEEE Micro, April
p6)
2O
Analysis
The problems of DFCS are ttle problems of
systems whose complexity has exceeded the
reach of the intellectual tools employed
Intuition, experience, and techniques derived
from mechanical and analog systems are
insufficient for complex, integrated, digital
systems
21
Synthesis
• Computer science has been addressing issues
of systematic design, fault tolerance, and the
mastery of complexity with some (limited)
success for the last 20 years
But there has been little interest in learning
about, and applying this knowledge to,
real-time control systems in general (and
little opportunity to apply it to DFCS)
And little of the lore and
real-time control system
captured and analyzed
wisdom of practical
design has been
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What Computer Science Can Offer DFCS
• Systematic techniques for the construction
of trustworthy software, including"
O Techniques for the precise specification
requirements and the development of
designs
of
O Systematic
structuring
systems
approaches to the
of distributed and
design and
concurrent
o Fault tolerant algorithms
O Systematic methods
analytic methods of
of testing and
verification
• Where do formal methods come in?
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Applied Mathematics and Engineering
Established engineering
applied mathematics
disciplines use
o As a notation for describing systems
o As an analytical tool for calculating and
predicting the behavior of systems
Computers can provide speed and
for the calculations
accuracy
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Applied Mathematics and
Engineering
Software
• The applied mathematics of
formal logic
software is
• Formal Logic can provide
O A notation for describing software
designs_formal specification
0 A calculus for analyzing and
behavior of systems_formal
predicting the
verification
o Computers can provide speed and
for the calculations
accuracy
Calculating the behavior of software is an
exercise in formal reasoning_i.e., theorem
proving
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Formal Methods
Methodologies for using
software engineering
mathematics in
Can be applied at many different levels,
both description and analysis
for
O. No application of formal methods
1. Quasi-formal pencil and paper techniques
2. Mechanized quasi-formal methods
3. Fully formal pencil and paper techniques
4. Mechanically checked
techniques
fully formal
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Benefits of Formal Specification
Unambiguous description facilitates
communication among engineers
• Early detection of certain errors
Encourages systematic, thoughtful
reuse of well-understood concepts
approacl_,
As documentation, reduces some of the
difficulties in maintenance and modification
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Benefits of Formal Verification
Subjects the system
increasing designers'
own creation
to extreme scrutiny,
understanding of their
Helps identify
confidence
assumptions, increases
Encourages simple, direct designs,
requirements_better systems
austere
Encourages and supports a systematic,
derivational approach to system design
Complements testing
on fundamentals
and allows it to focus
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Conclusion: What FM Can Offer DFCS
• Precise notations for
and designs
specifying requirements
• Concepts and structure for systematic design
intellectual tools for analyzing the
consistency of specifications and the
conformance of designs
A way to regain
complex systems
intellectual mastery of
and their interactions
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Recommendations
0 Just adding formal methods to existing
practice is inappropriate
Capture and analyze lore and wisdom (and
mistakes) of actual DFCS designs
Apply modern Computer Science (including
Formal Methods) to develop building blocks
for principled DFCS design
• Ultimately, build one and fly it!
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